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The paper analyses a simple reinforcing dynamics. The dynamics can be interpreted as a
learning dynamics with fixed aspiration level. All payoffs are assumed to be above this
aspiration level, therefore all strategies are reinforcing. Different versions of the dynamics
exhibit different convergence properties. The analysis starts with one-agent decision
problems and proceeds to games. Some results are available for decision problems and
simple games. For complex games computer simulations are performed. The hypothesis is
that the dynamics favors an "egalitarian" equilibrium even if it does not satisfy other
refinements.
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Evolutionary and learning processes in games attract much attention at the present time. In
these processes the dynamics of the game, or players’ choice of strategies over time, is
modeled explicitly. One can distinguish two main applications of such modeling. First,
explicit dynamics usually gives the answer to the question which equilibrium will be
selected starting from certain initial conditions. Stochastic dynamic processes might serve
as a selecting device among equilibria. Therefore, the evolutionary processes can be used
to refine Nash equilibria, that is for the very theoretical problems of game theory. Seminal
papers on this question are Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993).
The second application of evolutionary and learning processes is a more positive one. By
means of experiments the dynamics approximating real human behavior can be obtained
and analyzed. Usually people playing a game do not perform sophisticated calculations to
find a Nash equilibrium but learn to play the game by a simple learning dynamics. When
more than one equilibrium is present, sometimes the players fail to arrive at the “plausible”
(e.g. subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium or even at a Nash equilibrium at all under simple
dynamics. Even in case of one-player decision problems the optimal behavior is not
guaranteed. Known phenomena are “probability matching” (see, for example, Börgers and
Sarin (1996)) and "melioration" (see Herrnstein and Prelec (1991)), where examples are
given of dynamics and human behavior which show non-optimality. Arthur (1993) also
gives some experimental data on non-optimal behavior in decision problems. A case of
non-equilibrium play in games was reported in Roth and Erev (1995).
Those papers assert that a simple dynamics can explain to a large extent the behavior of
players in decision problems and simple games. The dynamics, as the human behavior in
their experiments, does not necessarily converge to the optimal action or to a (subgame
perfect) equilibrium in some of the examples they consider. In this paper we investigate
this dynamics analytically whenever possible and by means of computer simulations in
more complicated cases. Although the dynamics is formulated quite simply, the analysis of
it requires sophisticated tools of stochastic optimization.
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We compare also different versions of the dynamics, since some modifications of it lead to
different convergence results. However, we shall focus not only on the long run optimality
but also on the medium run since it can be of economic importance. The environment in an
economy is not likely to be constant indefinitely. Thus the speed of convergence will play
a role in our analysis. There is a trade-off between long-run convergence and speed
thereof and we shall consider this issue.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the model,
Section 3 gives the analysis for the case of one-player decision problem, Section 4 reports
results of simulations for several games and Section 5 concludes.
2  The model
We formulate the model for games though it can be easily simplified to decision problems.
There are n players. Denote the set of players by Ι. The stage game is a game in normal
form. Let S1,...,Sn be the sets of  pure strategies. The payoff functions πm:S1×...×Sn→R are
assumed to be non-negative for every player and for every profile of pure strategies,
πm(s1,...sn) ≥ 0 ∀m∈Ι,∀s1∈S1,...,sn∈Sn.
Let player m have k pure strategies, |Sm| = k. The state of player m at time t is described




mk)∈Rk. qtmj denotes the propensity of player m to play the
strategy j∈Sm at time t. The propensities are assumed to be strictly positive, qtmj > 0
∀t,∀m,∀j. Denote the sum of the propensities Σki=1 qtmi by Qtm. Given the vector of













mk)∈∆Sm, where ∆Sm is the set of mixed strategies of player m.
Working with propensities rather than probabilities is easier since with probabilities we
have to change them in such a way that they were between 0 and 1 while the only
restriction on propensities that they are non-negative.
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An interpretation of this is that every player possesses at every moment of time a mixed
strategy, characterized by the vector of probabilities ptm. Another interpretation can be that
for every player 1,...,n there is a large population of agents, the members of the population
possess a pure strategy and in each population the distribution of pure strategies is given
by the vectors pt.
The state of the whole process at time t is determined by the vectors qt1,...q
t
n. According
to the vector of probabilities derived from q’s, each player chooses a pure strategy to play
in the present period. The precise mechanism of choice is not modeled. In the first
interpretation above it could be a random device used by a player. In the second
interpretation above such a choice can be understood as a random draw of an agent with a
pure strategy from the population. The stage game is played with the chosen strategies.
We are interested in the dynamics of  ptm. Since it is determined through q
t
m, we must
specify the dynamics of the propensities.
We pose two main requirements on the dynamics. Firstly, it should be reinforcing: if a
strategy is played, its probability increases. Secondly, it should be in a sense "simple": no
complex functions must be involved. One class of dynamics satisfying these requirements
is following. The player triggers a strategy, observes the payoff and increases the
propensity of playing this strategy by this payoff. Then he renormalizes the propensities
by multiplying them by a certain variable, since this does not change the probabilities.
Therefore the expected motion of the dynamics does not change. However, the
normalization plays an important role, since it change the variance of the stochastic
process which can influence the convergence results and the speed of convergence. We try
to answer the question for which forms of normalization the dynamics converges to an
equilibrium and for which forms the speed of the dynamics is fast enough.
Formally, if player m chooses strategy j while the other players choose strategies s-m∈S-m,
then the state of player m at time t + 1 is defined as follows:
q q B A






















where Bmj = π(j,s-m) is the payoff, Atm is the normalizing multiplier. To keep the
propensities positive π(j,s-m) were assumed non-negative. The normalizing multiplier can












 . We consider this type of normalization since it is
mathematically tractable while gives already rich variety of results.
The variable Ctm can be deterministic, for example, C
t
m = Ct
ν, where C,ν are constant. In




m + Bmj, a random variable. Another
interesting case is Atm = δ < 1. The parameter δ can be understood as a forgetting
parameter since payoff got τ periods before will enter the sum multiplied by δτ. Ctm will
determine the step size of the algorithm as it would be clear later. In fact, the inverse to
Ctm has the same order as the step size of the dynamics. At time t = 0 the vectors of initial
propensities q0m are given, q
0
mj > 0 ∀m∈Ι,∀j∈Sm.
The model is fairly simple. However, it captures some important aspects of human
behavior. The updating of the strategies depends only on player’s own payoff. Notice that
it is exactly what is being done in one-agent decision problems with unknown distributions
of payoffs. The justification of carrying the dynamics to games is that people may not
know that they are participating in a game, or who their opponents are, or the preferences
of the opponents. Of course, in economic reality it is not the case, people usually have
some vague idea what is going on, or form expectations, but we shall consider this
extreme case. The model can also be applied to extensive form games where not all
information sets are reached during the course of the game, because the players do not
need to know the other players’ exact strategy.
The application of the model to one-agent decision problems and calibration of the
normalization version of it with Ctm = Ct
ν against human subjects was considered in
Arthur (1993). Roth and Erev (1995) also applied the non-normalized version with some
other extensions in some specific games to approximate human behavior. Posch (1996)
considered the normalized (Ctm = Ct
ν ) dynamics in 2x2 games. Laslier et al. (1996)
analyzed a more general version for both decision problems with 2 actions and 2x2 games.
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In their paper the new propensities were determined by a general function of the past play,
not necessarily the normalized sum. They considered the long-run convergence of the
dynamics. However, not much attention was paid to the speed of convergence and
medium term results, which certainly has an economic relevance.
An extended analysis of similar machine learning is provided in Narendra and Thathachar
(1989). However, they consider mostly the schemes with binary payoffs or with reward-
penalty nature, which require knowledge of maximal and minimal payoff. If a payoff to an
action is close to the maximal one, the probability of playing this action increases (reward)
while if a payoff is close to the minimal one, the probability decreases (penalty). Our
scheme can be considered as reward-reward scheme since independently of the outcome
the probability of playing a strategy increases. Some of the results for reward-penalty
schemes carry over to our scheme.
Roth and Erev (1995) argue that the dynamics captures two important aspects of learning.
The first one, the “Law of Effect”, states that the choices that have led to good outcomes
should be repeated more often in the future. In the model, each strategy gives a positive
payoff and the probability of playing it at the next round increases, hence this law is
fulfilled. The second aspect, the “Power Law of Practice”, says that learning tends to be
fast in the beginning and then slows down. In the no normalization case the propensities
only can increase not more than by a fixed amount (the maximal payoff to a strategy), so it
is indeed the case in the model. If ν > 0 in normalization then Ctm grows over time and the
learning slows down. The payoff at a late stage in the game changes the probability less
than at an early stage, when the aggregate propensity is not yet very high.
Another interpretation of the dynamics can be in the spirit of learning dynamics with an
aspiration level. In such dynamics a strategy is regarded as successful and its weight is
increased if it gives a payoff that is greater than the aspiration level. In our model the
aspiration level is set to 0, hence every strategy is successful or at least, not unsuccessful.
The aspiration level does not change throughout the game. From the “aspiration level”
literature side, a similar model for decision problems was considered by Börgers and
Sarin(1996), where the probabilities change directly, not through propensities. A general
model with aspirations can be found in Bendor et al (1994).
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3  The one-player decision problem
The long run convergence
Though the ultimate goal is to analyze the dynamics in games, it is interesting to consider
its behavior in one-player decision problems. Binmore et al (1996) expressed view that it
might be wiser to consider first the human behavior in decision problems and then apply it
to games. We shall proceed in this spirit.
The main question for every dynamics is whether it converges and if so, to what point. For
games it is desirable that a dynamics converges to a Nash equilibrium and even better to a
certain refined Nash equilibrium, for example, to a (subgame) perfect equilibrium. In one-
agent decision problems Nash equilibrium corresponds to the choice of the action which
gives highest expected payoff. Since all strategies are successful, the problem of path-
dependency may arise and it is not clear that the optimal action will be chosen in the long
run.
From the model described in Section 2 we have now  = 1 and we can omit subscript m in
the formulas. The payoff to strategy j π(sj) is now a random variable, given by the
environment. The environment is assumed to have a finite number of states which occur
with fixed probabilities independent of time. Denote the realization of  π(sj) at time t by Bt.
The agent still has k strategies or actions.
Let ej be the unit k-vector with 1 on j-th place and let b
t = Btej. Then we can rewrite the
formulas for the dynamics of the propensities in vector form with the multiplier expressed


















































Since qt/Qt = pt, it can be rewritten as
pt+1 = pt + at(bt - Btpt),
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where at = (Qt + Bt)-1 determines the step size of the process. If payoffs are bounded at
has the order of (Qt)-1. In the normalization case Qt = Ct = Ctν, hence at = O(t-ν). In the no
normalization case Q t m Q Q t Mt0 0+ ⋅ ≤ ≤ + ⋅ (where m is the minimal payoff, M is the
maximal payoff), hence at = O(t-1).
Let k be the optimal action, that is the expected payoff to it is highest. To see the expected
motion of the process, we calculate E[pt+1k|p
t].
From the expression for probabilities above E[pt+1k|p








































1 , where Φk is the expected payoff of



















































0 . It means that E[pt+1k|p
t] > ptk, that is the process is
absolutely expedient (Narendra and Thathachar (1989)) for the optimal action. However,
it does not necessarily mean that the optimal action is played in the limit t→∞ with
probability 1 as the following results show.
Proposition 3.1 (Arthur (1993), Posch (1996)) In the normalization case (Ct = Ctν) if ν <
1 or ν = 1 and C < m the non-optimal action is played in the limit with non-zero
probability.
The proof of ν < 1 case is in Arthur (1993), of ν = 1 and C < m case in Posch (1996).
The result states that the process does not necessarily converge to the optimal action for
some cases; however for other cases it does.
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Proposition 3.2 (Arthur (1993), Posch (1996)) In normalization case if ν = 1 and C ≥ m
then the probability of the optimal action converges to 1 almost surely1.
The proof is in the papers referred to.
Proposition 3.3 In the no normalization case the probability of the optimal action
converges to 1 almost surely.
We see that in the no normalization case the optimality is guaranteed; however by
changing it a little bit this result disappears.
Proposition 3.4 In the no normalization model with forgetting the probability of playing a
non-optimal action is not zero in the limit.
The proofs of propositions 3.3 and 3.4 are in Appendix 1.
We can see that the long run results are very different for different specifications of the
model. However, for economic relevance we should also look at the speed of convergence
and medium term results. It may well be that the optimal learning algorithm is too slow to
achieve good results in the medium run and may be inferior in that respect to a non-
optimal learning. The next section presents some analytical and simulation results
comparing different variations of the model.
The speed of convergence and the probability of convergence to the optimal action
There is a trade-off between the two, i.e. if the speed is high then the scheme is not
optimal and if the speed is sufficiently low then it is. In the normalization case, if ν < 1
then the learning is quick and non-optimal, while if ν = 1 the learning is slow enough to
achieve optimality. However, even in the non-optimal normalization case ν < 1 by
                                                       
1 A sequence of random variables xt is said to converge almost surely to a random variable x if
Prob[limt→∞|xt-x|<ε]=1 ∀ε>0.
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changing other parameters one can achieve probability of the optimal action as close to 1
as one desires, that is the scheme is ε-optimal2 (Narendra and Thathachar (1989)).
We can calculate expected motion of the processes and derive from it the expected rate of
convergence. However, to illustrate both issues of non-optimal convergence and the speed
thereof, we run simulations for two decision problems:
1) s1: 4 with probability 1/3, 1 with probability 2/3.
s2: 1 with probability 1/3, 4 with probability 2/3.
2) s1: 2 with probability 1
s2: 3 with probability 1
s3: 2.5 with probability 1
For the first problem Mean(s1) = 2, Mean(s2) = 3, hence the second problem is the certain
case of the first one plus an additional action. The second problem is devised to show how
convergence slows down with more actions. The sum of initial propensities is chosen quite
arbitrarily as 30, which is simply equal 10⋅ M for the second problem and close to
estimated in Arthur (1993) from human behavior.  Initial propensities q0 are equal. The
simulations were run for the normalization case with ν = 0, for the no normalization case,
and for the forgetting case with δ = 0.999.
The question remains what should be taken as the medium run. We have chosen, again
quite arbitrarily, 100000 periods as the long run, hence all what is before it is the medium
run. A justification for 100000 could be that if you have to chose an action every hour
then 100000 hours is approximately 11.5 years, a period that could be roughly considered
as with constant environment.
The results of the simulations are reported in Tables 1,2  in Appendix 2 for the problems
1),2) correspondingly. From Table 1 it is seen that if ν = 0 then the dynamics learns very
quickly: already at period 300 the probability of playing the optimal action 0.998. Both
others modification of the dynamics are slower. However, the dynamics with forgetting
                                                       
2 A scheme is said to be ε-optimal if ∀ε ∃T such that for t > T the probability of optimal action pt > 1-ε.
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parameter accelerates and at period 100000 it almost catches up the model with ν = 0. All
three variations converges to the optimal action in this case; the 'ν = 0' case collects
greater average payoff due to higher speed.
The second problem shows the non-optimality of the normalization approach. As Table 2
shows, not all of the simulation goes to the optimal action; some of them lock in another
one. Again it collects larger average payoff in the beginning. However, two other models
find out the optimal action and regain the payoff. The no-normalization model did not
catch up with the 'ν = 0' case but the forgetting variation of it did.
The main conclusion from the analysis of the decision problems is that in the medium run
a model which gives us sufficient speed of convergence while it does not lock in an
inferior action is in a sense "optimal". The model with the forgetting parameter seems to
satisfy the criterion since it learns slowly in the beginning while the normalized model with
ν = 0 gets locked in, and it accelerates after, while the no-normalization model explore its
optimality too slowly to catch up. The model with forgetting has a non-zero probability of
getting trapped into an inferior action, but the probability is very small. The formal
criterion could be the average payoff at period 100000. In the first problem the model with
forgetting has slightly less average payoff than the model with normalization but in the
second problem the payoff of the model with forgetting much higher. The payoff of the
no-normalization model is less in both problems. It should be noticed, however, that the
results may depend on the forgetting parameter and the choice of magnitude of initial
propensities. Nevertheless, we shall use the model with forgetting later in games.
4  Games
Games provide additional insight to the behavior of the dynamics. The payoffs now
depend not only on player’s own action but on actions of the opponents. Since the
opponents do not always choose their optimal strategy, it is more difficult for a player to
learn his optimal strategy. Normally, if the opponents play the same strategy all the time,
the player will eventually learn the best response to this strategy. However, a Nash
equilibrium is most likely outcome of the dynamics, since in an equilibrium all players play
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mutual best responses. We shall start the analysis with 2x2 games and proceed to more
complex ones.
2x2 games
The main result about the convergence in games is stated in Posch (1996) and Laslier et
al. (1996):
Theorem
(I) If the game has strict Nash equilibria and the dynamics uses normalization with ν = 1
and C > m or no normalization then the algorithm converges to the set of strict Nash
equilibria almost surely and all equilibria are attained in the limit with positive probability.
(II) If the game has no strict Nash equilibria then cycling is possible.
The proof for normalization case is in Posch (1996). Since the no-normalization case is
essentially equivalent to the normalization case with conditions given in the theorem, the
theorem carries over to it.
The theorem does not say anything about selection among strict Nash equilibria. To get
some insight we have run a number of simulations for two games with two Nash
equilibria. The first game is of pure coordination type, the second is of 'stag-hunt' type.
Game 1 s1 s2
s1 3, 3 1, 1
s2 1, 1 2, 2
Game 2 s1 s2
s1 3, 3 0.5, 2
s2 2, 0.5 2, 2
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Both games have two strict equilibria (s1,s1),(s2,s2). In the first game the efficient
equilibrium (s1,s1) is risk-dominant, in the second one the inefficient equilibrium (s2,s2) is
risk-dominant. Since the model with forgetting proved to be the most plausible one in the
medium run according to the average payoff criterion, we present results only for this
model. The results of the simulations are reported in Tables 3,4 in Appendix 3.
Table 3 shows that the efficient risk-dominant equilibrium is almost exclusively chosen by
the dynamics. Only one simulation converges to the inferior equilibrium. In Table 4 the
inefficient risk-dominant equilibrium is chosen much more often than the efficient one. The
results suggest that the risk-dominance, rather than efficiency, is the most important
criteria in choosing among equilibria by the dynamics. This result is in line with results in
Kandori et al (1993) and Young (1993) where different dynamics also favor risk-dominant
equilibrium.
Other games
Our main hypothesis is that the more "central" Nash outcome is more likely to observe
under the dynamics. 2x2 games are of no use in this respect since they have at most two
pure Nash equilibria, hence both are in a sense extreme.
We shall show that if the game possesses several equilibria then the “egalitarian” one, that
is the one with more or less equal payoffs for the players, has high chances of being
chosen in the medium run. The intuition for this is since the learning is simultaneous for
both players they are pressing each other and more likely to end up in a compromise.
To illustrate this point, we show the results of simulations of the dynamics for several
games. The first two games, the ultimatum game and the best shot game were analyzed in
Roth and Erev (1995). The third game, the oligopoly leadership game, has the same
structure as the best shot game but a different set of equilibria and through comparison of
these games one can see that the “egalitarian” equilibrium indeed has almost the same
probability of being chosen in the long run as the subgame perfect equilibrium. The fourth
game considered is a kind of "property" game. This game was analyzed in Young (1996).
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The ultimatum game
Two players are to divide 10$. The first player can demand x∈{1,...,9} for himself and,
accordingly, leave 10-x to the second player. The second player can then accept or reject
this demand. We assume that each player has 9 strategies {1,...,9}. The strategy j for
player 1 means that he demands j$ for himself and leaves (10-j)$ for the second player.
The strategy k for player 2 means that she accepts any demand ≤ k$, which leaves
≥ (10-k)$ for her, while she rejects any demand >k$. Thus the strategy set for player 2 is
restricted to monotone strategies, that is the strategies where the player accepts a demand
m > k but rejects a demand m ≤ k are ruled out. The game proceeds as follows. Each
player randomly chooses a strategy according to the vector of propensities. Let player 1
choose strategy j and player 2 choose strategy k. If j ≤ k, the demand of player 1 is
accepted and the players get j$ and (10-j)$ correspondingly. If j > k the demand is rejected
and both get 0$. Then the propensities of played strategies are updated according to the
dynamics. Note that the game is essentially a game in extensive form, though we analyzed
it in normal form. The first player knows whether his current demand is accepted or
rejected but does not know what would happen with greater or smaller demands. Our
model allows us to analyze the game since the updating depends only on obtained payoff
and does not depend on the payoffs that might be obtained. A pair of strategies ( j,j ) is an
equilibrium ∀ j ∈ {1,...,9}. ( 9,9 ) is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Table 5 in Appendix 3 shows the results of the simulations for 100000th period. It reports
the numbers of simulations which have the probability of playing a particular pair of
strategies larger than 0.5. Not all the simulation converge to the subgame perfect
equilibrium (9,9). At period 100000 the equilibrium (8,8) managed to attract the largest
number of simulations, while one simulation converges even to (5,5). The average payoff
of about 7 for Player 1 also shows that there are some money left on the table.
Roth and Erev (1995) use experiments for ultimatum game. Their data also favor more
“egalitarian” equilibria more than the subgame perfect one. The mean demand in the
experiments was between 5 and 6. From the point of view of the dynamics, a high demand
can yield 0 if rejected. A modest demand has smaller probability to be rejected because of
monotonicity of the strategies of Player 2. More often it yields a positive amount, thus
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reinforcing itself. Though a high demand reinforces itself better, it happens less often,
hence it is not clear a priori whether the subgame perfect equilibrium will be chosen. A
model of noisy replicator dynamic and extended discussion about the convergence to a not
subgame perfect equilibria in the Ultimatum Game can be found in Binmore et al (1995).
The best-shot game
There are 2 players in the game, each has 3 strategies {s1,s2,s3}. The first player plays first,
the second player observes first player’s move and plays her strategy. Thus the second
player has 33 = 27 strategies in normal form corresponding to the game. However, the
payoffs can be described by the 3×3 bimatrix since the payoffs depend only on strategy of
the first player and the answer on this strategy by the second player irrespective to what
she would do in response to other strategies of Player 1.
s1 s2 s3
s1 0, 0 1.95, 0.31 3.7, 0.42
s2 0.31, 1.95 0.31, 0.31 2.06, 0.42
s3 0.42, 3.7 0.42, 2.06 0.42, 0.42
The underlying story for the game is that the players choose their level of provision of a
public good. The cost of provision is an increasing function of the quantity provided. The
benefit from the good is an increasing function of the maximum between two players’
levels of provision. The strategies s1,s2,s3 correspond to the low, medium and high level of
provision. The numbers are taken from Roth and Erev (1995) who report about an
experiment on an extended version of this game and about simulations of various versions
of the dynamics.
Since the first player chooses first, the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for him is to
choose s1, and for the second player to choose s3 if the first player played s1, and to choose
s1 if the first player played s2 or s3. Denote this strategy of Player 2 as s3 1s1. Then the
subgame perfect equilibrium can be denoted by (s1, s3s1s1). The set of all Nash equilibria in
the game consists of (s1, s3xx), where x stands for any strategy s1, 2,s3 (the above
mentioned subgame perfect one belongs to this subset) and (s3, s1s1s1), (s3, s1s2s1). Note
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that in the first subset the payoffs are 3.7 for Player 1 and 0.42 for Player 2, while in the
second one the payoffs are inverse, 0.42 for Player 1 and 3.7 for Player 2. Thus there is no
“egalitarian” equilibrium in the game.
The averages of probabilities of strategies over a hundred simulations are reported in
Table 6 in Appendix 3. It is clearly seen that the set containing the subgame perfect
equilibrium (s1, s3xx) is chosen with probability indistinguishably close to 1. The results do
not differ much from those reported in Roth and Erev (1995, Table II).  Player 1 learns to
choose strategy 1 rather quickly. Learning of Player 2 is slower in the beginning since she
has much more strategies to choose from but it catches up towards period 100000. The
game quickly converges to the set of equilibria (s1, s3xx). The distribution among xx is
such that (s1, s3s1s1) is likely outcome though others are also present since the second
player does not have much opportunity to learn what she should play in respond to s2 and
s3.
A possible explanation for finding the subgame perfect equilibrium is that the difference in
payoffs between two equilibria is rather high for Player 1 and he learns not to play the
other equilibrium quickly. This differs from the ultimatum game where the difference in
payoffs from a demand of, say, 6 and 7 is not big if they are both accepted and the
difference is high if 7 is rejected. The best-shot game does not possess such “egalitarian”
equilibria, hence the convergence is to the subgame perfect one. In the next subsection we
consider a game with the same structure as the best-shot game but with an “egalitarian”
equilibrium.
The oligopoly leadership game
The structure of this game is as in the best-shot game. There are 2 players, one of which
moves first. However, the interpretation of the strategies is different and the payoffs are
different too. The players are firms; they choose levels of production. Firm 1 chooses first,
Firm 2 follows. The price for the good produced by the firms and therefore the profit
received by the firms depend on the aggregate level of production. However, the demand
function is not linear as it is usually assumed, hence the price does not depend linearly on
the quantity. By choosing the appropriate demand and cost functions (quadratic in the
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total output and in firm’s own output correspondingly) the following payoffs can be
obtained.
s1 s2 s3
s1 1,1 1,2.3 1,4
s2 2.3, 1 2,2 0.6, 0.3
s3 4, 1 0.3, 0.6 0, 0
(the magnitude of the payoffs has the same order as in the best-shot game)
Interpreting strategies s1, 2,s3 as low, medium and high level of production
correspondingly, one can see that the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for Firm 1 is to
capture the market by choosing high level of production s3. Firm 2 is then left with a small
remaining fraction of the market. The payoffs are 4 for Firm 1 and 1 for Firm 2. These
strategies correspond to the subset of the Nash equilibria of the game (s3, xxs1), where
again x denotes any of the strategies s1,s2,s3. The equilibrium (s3, s3s2s1), belonging to this
subset, is subgame perfect. The game, however, possesses two other types of Nash
equilibria. One of them, as in the best-shot game, is the inversion of the subgame perfect
equilibrium, namely (s1,s3s3s2) and (s1,s3s3s3) with payoffs 1 for Firm 1 and 4 for Firm 2.
The new type of Nash equilibria is the “egalitarian” one: (s2, x 2s2) and (s2, xs2s3), where
payoffs are 2 for both firms. We argue that this equilibrium does not have much fewer
chances of being chosen in the medium run than the subgame perfect equilibrium. Table 7
of Appendix 3 shows the averages of probabilities of strategies over a hundred
simulations.
From the table it can be seen that the "egalitarian" strategy (s2,s2) i  learnt faster than the
subgame perfect one. At period 1000 the equilibrium (s2,s2) has larger probability of being
played while with time the subgame perfect one regain its strength. At period 10000 the
probabilities of playing both strategies s2 and s3 for Player 1 are equal and at period
100000 the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy s3 finally gets larger probability. If the
“egalitarian” one fails to gain the lion’s share in probability distribution in the beginning
then the subgame perfect equilibrium can regain the probability in later periods. However,
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the “egalitarian” equilibrium succeeds in being selected in about one third of the
simulations. 23 simulations have the probability of playing this equilibrium after 100000
periods larger than 0.5. For the set of equilibria containing subgame perfect one the
number of such simulations are 45. This shows that the "egalitarian" equilibrium has not
much fewer chances to be selected in the medium run. And since the subgame perfect
equilibrium (s3, s3s2s1) also has s2 as response to s2, the early recognition of the
"egalitarian" equilibrium helps to discriminate the subgame perfect equilibrium among the
set (s3, xxs1). The dynamics converges to the subgame perfect equilibrium in 2/3 cases
when it converges to this set.
The oligopoly leadership game, as well as the ultimatum game, possesses an equilibrium
that lies between two extreme equilibria where almost all payoff goes to one player. In this
“intermediate” equilibrium the payoffs are divided more or less equally. This is why we
call it the “egalitarian” equilibrium. In distinction to these two games, the best-shot game
does not possess such an equilibrium and the subgame perfect one gains dominance very
easily. The implication of this observation is that the selection of equilibria by the
dynamics presented in the medium run may depend mainly on the structure of the set of
Nash equilibria of the game. If the game has only “extreme” equilibria, the players (or at
least one of them) quickly learn to play the subgame perfect one. A possible explanation
might be that it is too risky for the other player to insist on the other extreme, therefore
she has to allow the unfavorable for her subgame perfect outcome. However, in the
presence of an equilibrium between those extremes, it is not easy for them to find out the
subgame perfect one. My conjecture is that this is an inherent feature of the dynamics that
an equilibrium between extreme equilibria has rather big chances to attract the process in
the medium run, though in the long run a subgame perfect equilibrium prevails. However,
we have no proof of that at hand. More work has to be done to derive such a proof.
The "property" game
In analysis of above games the "egalitarian" equilibrium was not subgame perfect while
there was a subgame perfect equilibrium which regains the probability though the
"egalitarian" equilibrium did not perform badly. In this subsection we consider a game
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where all three equilibria seems equally plausible and we cannot give preference to one of
them from conventional refinement criteria. The game has following payoff matrix
s1 s2 s3
s1 1, 1 1, 1 4, 2
s2 1, 1 3, 3 1, 1
s3 2, 4 1, 1 1, 1
The story is that suppose two people divide a property of 6 (in a case of divorce, for
example). They can agree on three outcomes (4,2),(3,3)(2,4). In the case of disagreement
they both get payoff of 1. The equilibria in the game are (s1,s3),(s2,s2),(s3,s1). The second
one is "egalitarian" one in the sense that it has equal distribution of payoffs while two
others has one player getting more than the other.
The results of the simulations are reported in Table 8 of Appendix 3. The simulations
show that starting from equal initial propensities for all three strategies, the middle
equilibrium is chosen more often than the other two though all three equilibria are chosen
in the long run. The probability of playing the pair of strategies (s2, 2) is larger than the
probability of playing the other two equilibria and in larger number of simulation the
dynamics converges to the middle equilibrium rather than to the other two as it is seen
from "Modes" column. The explanation for this is that if we calculate the expected
probabilities of playing the equilibria for period 2 (for period 1 they are all equal since the
initial propensities are equal) then the expected probability of playing the middle
equilibrium is slightly higher than for other two equilibria. Hence in expectations the
dynamics should go to the "egalitarian" equilibrium. Due to the noise other equilibria also
have a chance to be selected and it is confirmed from simulations. Our hypothesis about
the likeliness of the "egalitarian" equilibrium in some games is supported too. Another
supporting paper on this subject is Young (1996), where the finding for pure coordination
games is similar under a different dynamics.
19
5 Conclusion
The simple dynamics captures certain aspects of human learning such as the “Law of
Effect” and the “Power Law of Practice”. Hence it may describe the behavior of humans
in decision problems and games. The analysis for the case of one-player decision problem
shows that the dynamics selects the optimal strategy in the long run despite the fact that
the non-optimal strategy is also reinforcing. However, as it was shown, the speed of
convergence is slow. The speed of convergence for the dynamics seems to be dependent
on the difference in payoffs between the optimal and non-optimal strategies and on the
number of strategies. Since the speed is too slow to produce satisfactory results for the
medium run, we modified the dynamics such as there is a small probability of locking in an
inferior action but the speed of convergence is improved considerably. The speed of
convergence play a role for most real games. In principle chess can be solved explicitly but
we do not have all the time in the world just to play chess. Therefore we must sometimes
admit having non-optimality in moves. According to the average payoff criterion the best
model given the tradeoff between speed and convergence seems to be the model with
forgetting parameter.
Application of the dynamics for games yields some interesting observations. Though it
seems that in the long run the dynamics will eventually converge to the subgame perfect
equilibrium, in the medium run it sometimes fails to find an equilibrium at all (as in the
ultimatum game) or it converges to an equilibrium that is not subgame perfect. This
equilibrium often has the feature to be “in the middle” of the set of Nash equilibria for the
game (as in the oligopoly leadership game and in the property game) and gives more or
less equal payoffs for both players. Such an equilibrium can be called “egalitarian”. In the
absence of a suitable “egalitarian” equilibrium the dynamics finds the subgame perfect
equilibrium and rather quickly.
The paper analyzes the dynamics formally only for the case of one-player decision problem
and gives some examples how it can perform in games. The direction for further research
are establishing the analytical results for games since simulation studies can give only
partial insight onto the problem. More games with various properties should be analyzed
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to establish certain features of the dynamics. Some extensions of the basic model are
possible. An interesting extension is to games with negative payoffs or, equivalently, a
dynamics where not all strategy profiles are reinforcing. If the players know the game or
the decision problem, the assumption that all strategies are reinforcing seems not very
natural since the players may hope to obtain the highest payoffs. Also the assumption of
the fixed aspiration level can be relaxed though it may bring about the phenomenon of
“probability matching”, which is absent in the present model.
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Appendix 1
Proposition 3.3 In the no-normalization case the probability of playing the optimal
strategy converges to 1 almost surely.
Proof Notice that Q t m Q Q t Mt0 0+ ⋅ ≤ ≤ + ⋅  in this case. Then c1t ≤ Qt ≤ c2t with
m < c1. Then the dynamic is equivalent to the normalization case with ν = 1. According to
Proposition 3.2 the process then converges to the optimal action.
Proposition 3.4 In the no-normalization case with forgetting the probability of playing
non-optimal action in positive in the limit t→∞.
Proof The proof is along the lines of similar proof for normalization case given in Arthur
(1993). Notice that now we have Q0 + m Στ=1t δτ ≤ Qt ≤ Q0 + M Στ=1t δτ. Calculating the
















, that is Qt has the
order of (1-δt).
To proof the non-optimality consider the event that an inferior action j is triggered from
time t. Denote this event as Dt. We need to show that Prob{Dt} = Πt∞pjt > 0. Let
aj
t = 1 - pj
t. Since 0 < aj
t < 1 the convergence of Πt∞(1 - ajt) is necessary from the
convergence of Σajt. From our dynamic equation for probabilities pt+1 = pt + at(bt - Btpt),






































































. It means that aj
t decreases faster
than a geometric series and therefore converges. Therefore the probability of playing the
inferior action j from time t is positive and the proposition is proven.
22
Appendix 2
In the row labeled 'Probability' the probability of the optimal action is given; in the row
labeled 'Mode' the number of simulations where the probability of the optimal action is
highest and larger than 0.5; the row labeled 'Av.Payoff' gives the average payoff up to time
t. The column 'ν = 0' is for normalization case with ν = 0, the column 'no-norm' for no
normalization case, and the column 'forgetting' for the case with δ = 0.999.
Table 1. Averages of the probability of playing the optimal strategy and the numbers of simulations where
the mode is the optimal strategy and the average payoff for problem 1)
  Time ν=0 no-norm forgetting
300 Probability 0.998 0.764 0.768
Mode 100 99 97
Av. Payoff 2.896 2.706 2.701
10000 Probability 1 0.914 0.992
Mode 100 100 100
Av. Payoff 2.997 2.879 2.937
100000 Probability 1 0.959 1
Mode 100 100 100
Av.Payoffs 2.999 2.939 2.994
100 simulations, q0=(15,15)
Table 2. Averages of the probability of playing the optimal strategy and the numbers of simulations where
the mode is the optimal strategy and the average payoff for problem 2)
  Time ν=0 no-norm forgetting
300 Probability 0.841 0.511 0.532
Mode 85 75 76
Av. Payoff 2.812 2.630 2.634
10000 Probability 0.860 0.687 0.904
Mode 86 90 100
Av. Payoff 2.926 2.777 2.863
100000 Probability 0.860 0.774 1
Mode 86 97 100




The column 'Probabilities' reports the probabilities of equilibria, (s1,s1),(s2,s2), respectively.
The column 'Modes' reports the number of simulations where the probability of the
equilibrium is larger than 0.5. The column 'Average Payoffs' gives average payoffs up to
time t for players 1,2 respectively.
Table 3. Averages of the probability of playing the equilibrium, the numbers of simulations where the
mode is on the eqilibrium and the average payoffs for Game 1.
  Time Probabilities Modes Average Payoffs
300 0.638, 0.062 79, 1 2.136, 2.136
1000 0.816, 0.023 93, 1 2.410, 2.410
10000 0.990, 0.010 99, 1 2.882, 2.882
100000 0.990, 0.010 99, 1 2.979, 2.979
100 simulations, q0=(15,15)
Table 4. Averages of the probability of playing the equilibrium, the numbers of simulations where the
mode is on the equilibrium and the average payoffs for Game 2.
  Time Probabilities Modes Average Payoffs
300 0.150, 0.482 7, 52 1.866, 1.862
1000 0.120, 0.620 9, 69 1.893, 1.887
10000 0.106, 0.877 11, 88 2.028, 2.027
100000 0.120, 0.880 12, 88 2.110, 2.109
100 simulations, q0=(15,15)
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For the ultimatum game we report the results only for 100000th period. The number in
cell (i,j) represents the number of simulations where the average probability of playing
pair (i,j) is highest and larger than 0.5.
Table 5. Numbers of simulations with mode on pairs of strategies and the average payoffs for Ultimatum
game.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 6 12
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 15
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
100 simulations, q0=(10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10)
Average payoffs: Player 1: 7.141
Player 2: 2.789
For the best shot and oligopoly leadership games the results are reported in following
manner. For Player 1 the probabilities of playing each of the three strategies are reported.
For Player 2 the probabilities of answers to given strategy of Player 1 are reported.
Table 6. Averages of probabilities for the best-shot game
Time s1 s2 s3 Av.Payoffs
1000         Player 1 0.951 0.036 0.009 2.151
                 Player 2 on s1 0.127 0.331 0.538 0.506
10000        Player 1 0.999 0.000 0.000 3.195
                 Player 2 on s1 0.000 0.058 0.941 0.411
100000      Player 1 1 0 0 3.645
                 Player 2 on s1 0 0 1 0.419
100 simulations;  q0=(10,10,10) for both players
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Table 7. Averages of probabilities for the oligopoly leadership game
Time s1 s2 s3 Av.Payoffs
1000         Player 1 0.052 0.567 0.380 1.975
                 Player 2 on s2








10000        Player 1 0.000 0.500 0.500 2.621
                 Player 2 on s2








100000      Player 1 0 0.420 0.580 3.079
                 Player 2 on s2








100 simulations;  q0=(10,10,10) for both players
For the Property game the set of equilibria is (s1,s3),(s2,s2),(s3,s1). The numbers in the table
are given correspondingly in this order of equilibria. 'Probabilities' are the probabilities of
the equilibria, 'Modes' are the numbers of simulations where the probability of playing an
equilibrium more than 0.5. 'Average Payoffs' gives average payoffs up to time t for players
1,2 correspondingly.
Table 8. Averages of the probability of playing the equilibrium, the numbers of simulations where the
mode is on the equilibrium and the average payoffs for the "property" game.
  Time Probabilities Modes Average Payoffs
300 0.113, 0.191, 0.143 2, 12, 4 1.777, 1.831
1000 0.133, 0.260, 0.175 8, 29, 18 1.920, 1.993
10000 0.289, 0.406, 0.284 30, 41, 29 2.612, 2.651
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